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It was the best oftimes, it was the worst oftimes.
Charles Dickens, A Tale ofTwo Cities
"Similar but different" provides a succinct yet reasonably accurate summary
of many dimensions oflife in Canada and the United States. This description
certainly applies to the role played by unions and collective bargaining in the
two societies. Countries vary greatly in their industrial relations systems-the
legal and institutional arrangements affecting labor-management relations-
and in the context of the differences among such countries as Australia, Ger-
many, France, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the Canadian and
U.S. industrial relations systems are very similar. Yet there are important dif-
ferences. Perhaps the most significant of these is the substantial differential
that has emerged in the past two to three decades in the extent of union orga-
nization in the two countries. The purpose of this paper is to examine this
differential. I begin by describing the salient features ofthe extent ofunioniza-
tion in Canada and the United States. I proceed to examine possible explana-
tions for the differences in unionization that have recently emerged, including
the role that public policies pursued in the two countries may have played in
this phenomenon.
4.1 The Broad Picture
Between 1920 and 1960 union growth in Canada exhibited a pattern
broadly similar to that in the United States (see table 4.1 and figure 4.1). The
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Table 4.1 Union Membership as a Percentage ofNonagricultural Paid Workers
in Canada and the United States, 1920-90
Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada










1965 29.7 30.1 30.0
1970 33.6 29.6 33.1
1975 35.6 28.9 32.2
1980 37.1 23.2 32.2
1981 36.7 22.6 34.2 32.9
1982 37.0 21.9 33.3
1983 37.9 20.7 20.4 35.7
1984 37.9 19.4 37.5 19.1 35.1
1985 38.1 18.3 34.4
1986 37.7 35.7 17.8 34.1
1987 37.0 17.0 33.3
1988 36.5 35.5 17.0 33.7
1989 36.2 16.4 34.1
1990 36.2 33.1 16.1
Sources: Column 1: Labour Canada, Directory of Labour Organizations in Canada 1990/91
(Ottawa: Ministry ofSupply and Services). The 1950 observation is for 1951. 2. L. Troy and N.
Sheflin, Union Source Book: Membership, Finances, Structure, Directory (West Orange, N.J.:
Industrial Relations Data and Information Services, 1985). 3. Data from the following special
supplements to Statistics Canada's Labour Force Survey: Survey ofWork History (1981); Survey
of Union Membership (1984); Labour Market Activity Survey (1986-90). These observations
include union membership in agriculture and are expressed as a percentage of all paid workers.
4. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, various years. 5. Statistics Can-
ada, Corporations and Labor Unions Returns Act, various years. Due to amendments to the act
that became effective in 1983, the pre-1983 observations are not comparable to subsequent ob-
servations. See Statistics Canada (1992a, 43) for the impact of these amendments. These data
include union membership in agriculture and are expressed as a percentage ofall paid workers.
extent of union organization-as measured by the proportion of nonagricul-
tural paid workers who are union members1-fell during the 1920s in both
countries, bottoming out at 12 to 14 percent at the beginning of the Great
Depression. Union density grew modestly during the early 1930s and then
dramatically-from about 14 percent to over 30 percent-between 1935 and
1. Other measures of the extent of union organization-such as union membership as a per-
centage ofpaid workers or collective agreement coverage as a percentage ofnonagricultural paid
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Fig. 4.1 Union density in the United States and Canada, 1920-90
Sources: See table 4.1.
the early 1950s. During this period union growth in Canada lagged behind
that in the United States, possibly reflecting the later passage in Canada ofthe
key legislation providing workers with the right to form and join unions. 2
Nonetheless, by 1952 the extent of union organization in Canada had caught
up with that in the United States. Subsequently, union density declined in a
parallel fashion in both countries. This period ofslower growth in union mem-
bership than in the labor force was sharply reversed in Canada in the early
1960s but continued-indeed accelerated-in the United States. Thus for
most of the past three decades, a growing gap has developed in the quanti-
tative significance of unions and collective bargaining in the two societies
(fig. 4.1).
Until recently, Dickens's characterization that "it was the best of times, it
was the worst oftimes" seemed as apt a description ofthe state ofunions and
collective bargaining in the two countries ofNorth America as ofthe cities of
London and Paris during the French Revolution. The challenge for social
2. The key legislation in Canada, the National War Labour Order, Order-in-Council P.C. 1003,
enacted in 1944, was to a considerable degree modeled on the U.S. National Labor Relations Act
(Wagner Act) of 1935.112 W. Craig Riddell
scientists was to explain why organized labor was declining in importance in
the United States yet evidently growing in importance in Canada.
As both figure 4.1 and table 4.1 indicate, however, the extent of unioniza-
tion in Canada has been declining, albeit slowly, since 1985 when union mem-
bership reached a peak of38 percent ofnonagricultural paid workers, or about
30 percent of the civilian labor force. Union density also declined during the
1980s in a number of other countries-including Japan, the Netherlands,
Italy, and the United Kingdom (Freeman 1990). This suggests that a common
set offorces may be affecting collective bargaining in several countries, albeit
having an earlier and more dramatic impact in the United States.
Whether or not this is the case, two key questions remain. First, after fol-
lowing a broadly similar pattern over much ofthis century, why have the for-
tunes of the Canadian and American labor movements diverged dramatically
since the early 1960s? Second, what accounts for the substantial differential
in union coverage that currently exists?
To complete the broad picture, cross-sectional evidence is presented in table
4.2. The data come from supplements to the Canadian Labour Force Survey
(LFS) and the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS), surveys that are very
similar in terms oftheir methodology. Each survey provides two measures of
the extent ofunion organization: union membership and collective agreement
coverage. For most purposes, the latter is the preferred measure. A feature
common to Canadian and American labor legislation is the principle ofexclu-
sive jurisdiction, which states that, once certified, the union represents all
workers in the bargaining unit, whether or not they are union members. Thus
if the purpose of the extent of union organization variable is to measure the
proportion of workers whose wages and working conditions are determined
by collective bargaining, the preferred statistic is collective agreement cover-
age.
Table 4.2 shows this preferred measure of unionization disaggregated by
age, sex, full-time and part-time employment, occupation, and industry. The
remarkable feature revealed by these statistics is that union density in Canada
is approximately double that in the United States across a wide range ofindus-
tries, occupations, and types of workers. These tabulations suggest that a
good rule ofthumb is that in the United States the probability ofany particular
type ofworker being represented by a union is about halfthat ofthe same type
ofworker in Canada. This observation suggests that the current differential in
union coverage is a pervasive phenomenon that is not confined to specific
segments ofthe labour force.
Inspection of table 4.2 also reveals that the Canada-U.S. unionization dif-
ferential widened during the 1984-90 period. Union density declined in both
countries, but more rapidly in the United States, and thus the ratio of Cana-
dian to U.S. union coverage increased from 1.9 to 2. 1. In addition, these data
indicate that the extent to which Canadian union coverage exceeds that in the
United States is often greatest (and is increasing most rapidly) in those seg-113 Unionization in Canada and the United States
Table 4.2 Percentage ofEmployed Paid Workers Covered by a Collective Agreement
by Age, Sex, Employment Status, Occupation, and Industry in Canada and
the United States, 1984, 1986, and 1990
1984 1986 1990
Canada U.S. Ratio Canada U.S. Ratio Canada U.S. Ratio
Both sexes 41.8 21.6 1.9 39.9 19.9 2.0 37.6 18.3 2.1
16-24a 23.0 9.5 2.4 20.9 8.4 2.5 19.7 7.7 2.6
25-34 44.4 21.3 2.1 40.8 18.4 2.2 36.8 16.1 2.3
35-44 50.6 27.4 1.8 48.1 25.3 1.9 44.4 22.8 1.9
45-54 49.2 28.8 1.7 48.4 27.4 1.8 48.3 25.0 1.9
55-64 49.4 27.8 1.8 47.0 26.5 1.8 45.4 24.3 1.9
Males 46.0 25.7 1.8 43.7 23.7 1.8 40.5 21.4 1.9
16-24a 25.6 11.6 2.2 22.8 10.3 2.2 20.8 9.5 2.2
25-34 46.8 24.5 1.9 42.8 21.4 2.0 38.6 18.5 2.1
35-44 55.3 32.5 1.7 51.8 30.2 1.7 47.4 26.1 1.8
45-54 55.4 34.3 1.6 54.2 32.8 1.7 54.1 29.8 1.8
55-64 54.7 32.7 1.7 53.3 31.4 1.7 52.1 28.7 1.8
Females 36.6 16.8 2.2 35.2 15.5 2.3 34.3 14.9 2.3
16-24a 20.3 7.3 2.8 18.9 6.4 3.0 18.4 5.8 3.2
25-34 41.5 17.2 2.4 38.5 14.7 2.6 34.9 13.2 2.6
35-44 44.8 21.3 2.1 43.5 19.7 2.2 41.5 19.2 2.2
45-54 40.8 22.0 1.9 40.6 21.1 1.9 41.8 19.8 2.1
55-64 40.9 21.7 1.9 36.4 20.5 1.8 35.8 19.2 1.9
Full-time 45.5 24.5 1.9 43.2 22.5 1.9 40.0 20.5 2.0
Part-time 23.4 9.0 2.6 24.6 8.4 2.9 27.6 8.4 3.3
Occupation
Managerial, professional,
technical 47.0 19.6 2.4 43.0 18.1 2.4 42.7 17.4 2.5
Clerical 35.3 17.4 2.0 36.0 16.3 2.2 31.5 16.1 2.0
Sales 12.1 7.4 1.6 12.1 7.1 1.7 11.2 5.9 1.9
Service 32.1 17.2 1.9 33.2 15.9 2.1 32.3 15.6 2.1
Primary, except mining 24.6 6.4 3.8 18.4 6.9 2.7 19.6 5.5 3.6
Processing, machining,
laborers 54.2 34.6 1.6 51.6 32.2 1.6 49.6 28.1 1.8
Transportation, moving 49.4 37.0 1.3 50.4 32.8 1.5 42.4 30.7 1.4
Materials handling 52.0 29.4 1.8 50.0 26.5 1.9 47.9 24.5 2.0
Industry
Agriculture 2.8 3.3 0.8 5.4 2.9 1.9 6.7 2.1 3.2
Mining 36.5 19.8 1.8 38.2 19.1 2.0 40.9 20.2 2.0
Construction 42.3 24.8 1.7 37.1 23.4 1.6 35.2 22.2 1.6
Manufacturing 49.0 28.4 1.7 46.8 25.8 1.8 43.5 22.2 2.0
Durable 52.2 30.0 1.7 50.4 27.3 1.8 44.4 23.7 1.9
Nondurable 45.9 25.8 1.8 42.8 23.5 1.8 42.8 20.0 2.1
Transportation 58.4 39.4 1.5 55.9 36.4 1.5 51.5 34.1 1.5
Communication, utilities 71.5 45.4 1.6 72.3 40.7 1.8 66.2 38.3 1.7
Wholesale trade 16.2 9.5 1.7 16.5 8.2 2.0 14.2 7.3 1.9
Retail trade 15.9 8.7 1.8 15.8 7.7 2.1 15.6 6.9 2.3
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Table 4.2 (continued)
1984 1986 1990
Canada U.S. Ratio Canada U.S. Ratio Canada U.S. Ratio
Finance, insurance, real estate 12.9 4.0 3.2 11.7 3.6 3.3 13.1 3.4 3.9
Services 43.4 8.8 4.9 41.1 7.8 5.3 38.8 7.1 5.5
Public administration 74.7 43.9 1.7 75.1 43.2 1.7 72.3 43.3 1.7
Sources: Statistics Canada, unpublished data from the 1984 Survey of Union Membership and the 1986
and 1990 Labour Market Activity Surveys, supplements to the Labour Force Survey; U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 1985, January 1987, and January 1992.
aIn Canada, 15-24 years.
ments of the labor force that are growing quickly and that have typically had
low degrees of unionization: females (2.3 in 1990); part-time employment
(3.3 in 1990, up from 2.6 in 1984); managerial, professional, and technical
occupations (2.5 in 1990); service industries such as retail trade (2.3), fi-
nance, insurance, and real estate (3.9), and services (5.5). These observations
suggest that Canadian unions have been more successful in organizing those
segments of the labor force experiencing the greatest net growth in employ-
ment.
4.2 Alternative Explanations
The decline in U.S. union density in the past three decades has attracted
considerable attention. This keen interest is certainly appropriate. Whether
one believes it to be a good thing, a bad thing, or a bit ofboth, the substantial
fall in union strength in the United States is one ofthe most significant social
phenomena ofthe postwar period. Not all ofthe discussion has been about the
causes ofthe decline in union strength-social scientists and others have also
debated both the consequences of the decline and the role of public policies
(e.g., labor law reform) to deal with consequences believed to be socially
harmful (see, for example, Edwards 1986; Strauss, Gallagher, and Fiorito
1991; Weiler 1983, 1984). Nonetheless, a key aspect ofany social phenome-
non is understanding its origines); accordingly, there has been a good deal of
research on the causes of the decline in unions in the United States (e.g. ,
Dickens and Leonard 1985; Farber 1985, 1990; Freeman 1985, 1989; Neu-
mann and Rissman 1984).
Much of the research initially focused exclusively on the United States.
Beginning with Weiler (1983), however, the value ofadopting a comparative
Canada-U.S. perspective has increasingly been recognized. In particular, the
many similarities between the two countries' economies and industrial rela-
tions systems may result in a situation with elements similar to a controlled
experiment, thus perhaps enabling some explanations ofthe decline in unions115 Unionization in Canada and the United States
in the United States to be rejected because these explanations cannot account
for the observed behavior in Canada. As stated by Richard Freeman (1988,
69): "A persuasive explanation of the decline in union density in the United
States should also explain why density did not decline in Canada in the same
time period [1970-85]." For this reason, the various explanations examined
in this paper are phrased in terms of their potential ability to account for both
the decline in union density in the United States and the divergence in the
extent ofunion organization between the United States and Canada.
Perhaps the most common explanation has to do with the changing struc-
ture ofthe economy and the labor force. Specifically, most ofthe employment
changes that have occurred in the past three decades-away from manufactur-
ing and toward services; away from blue-collar and toward white-collar; away
from male and full-time and toward female and part-time-represent declines
in the relative importance ofsectors that traditionally have been highly union-
ized and increases in the relative importance of sectors that traditionally have
had low union density. Thus ifunion density remained constant in each sector
or for each type of worker, the economy-wide extent of union organization
would decline due to these structural shifts.
Another explanation involves changes in the U.S. legal regime (the laws,
their interpretation, and their administration and enforcement) relating to
unions and collective bargaining during the post-World War II period. Differ-
ences between Canada and the United States in such areas as certification and
decertification procedures, bankruptcy and succession rights, first contract ne-
gotiation, and union security arrangements are argued to be factors contribut-
ing to the differential in union coverage.
A related view is that the decline in unionization in the United States can
largely be attributed to the rise in management opposition, both legal and
illegal, to unions (Freeman 1985, 1988). The dramatic rise in unfair labor
practices is evidence of a broader attempt by U.S. management to operate in
a "union-free environment." The rise in unfair labor practices is not surpris-
ing, given the incentives facing employers (Flanagan 1987). Increased man-
agement opposition to unions can be attributed in part to a more competitive
economic environment and to the substantial union-nonunion wage differen-
tial.
A fourth hypothesis is that there has been a reduction in the desire for col-
lective representation because of the growth of substitute services. There are
two variants of this view. One is that governments have gradually provided
more ofthe employment protection and nonwage benefits that were originally
important factors underlying workers' desire for organizing collectively (Neu-
mann and Rissman 1984). The other is that employers have become increas-
ingly sophisticated in their human resource practices and now provide many
of the services (e.g., grievance procedures) that workers previously received
only in unionized firms (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986).
A final explanation, which is in many ways the simplest and most pro-116 W. Craig Riddell
found, is that there has been in the United States a reduction in public sympa-
thy toward unions and collective bargaining (Lipset 1986). This shift in atti-
tudes has resulted in a decline in workers' desire for collective forms of
representation and a decline in the public support for achieving the goals of
the labor movement via the political process. A corollary ofthis thesis is that
the Canada-U.S. differential in union coverage can be attributed to fundamen-
tal value differences between the two societies-with Canada being a society
that relies more on government, state intervention in the economy, and collec-
tive forms of organization and the United States being a society that empha-
sizes free enterprise and individual rather than collective rights and freedoms
(Lipset 1986).
The remainder of the paper assesses these explanations, using the "natural
experiment" provided by the differential experience ofCanada and the United
States. To as great an extent as possible, I attempt to use data and other infor-
mation that are comparable between the two countries. The analysis begins by
examining the extent to which the differential in union coverage can be attrib-
uted to differences between Canada and the United States in the demand for
unionization versus differences in the supply ofunionization.
4.3 The Demand for and Supply ofCollective Representation: A
Canada-U.S. Comparison
The growth and incidence of union organization can be analyzed using a
demand and supply framework (Ashenfelter and Pencavel 1969; Pencavel
1971). The demand for union representation emanates from employees and
depends on the expected benefits and costs of collective representation. The
supply ofunionization emanates from the organizing and contract administra-
tion activities of union leaders and their staff. Employers can affect the de-
mand for union representation by altering the costs and/or benefits as per-
ceived by unorganized employees. Employers can also alter the supply side
by changing the costs and/or benefits to union leaders ofrepresenting existing
members and organizing new members.
This framework may be useful in the present context because several ofthe
hypotheses discussed above differ in their implications for the demand for and
supply of unionization. For example, the "growth of union substitutes" view
predicts that the observed behavior is due to a pure decline in demand, while
the changes in the legal regime are expected to reduce both demand and sup-
ply. On the other hand, the structural shift hypothesis implies that there have
been no changes in either demand or supply for a given type of worker (and
union leader); rather, the aggregate behavior is due to the changing composi-
tion ofthe labor force.
For these reasons, this section provides an empirical analysis that attempts
to determine the extent to which the Canada-U.S. differential in union cover-117 Unionization in Canada and the United States
age can be attributed to differences in the demand for union representation
versus differences on the supply side. 3
Unfortunately, it is generally difficult with the available data to determine
the extent to which observed behavior is due to demand-side factors, supply-
side factors, or both. For example, there is a strong relationship between
union incidence and establishment size. This relationship could be due to a
stronger desire for union representation among workers in large establish-
ments-for example, because they have more need for a collective voice than
do workers in small establishments. However, the relationship could also exist
because union leaders target large establishments in their organizing drives in
an attempt to maximize the number of potential new members per dollar of
organizing expenditure. Similarly, the finding that, holding wages constant,
workers with more education are more likely to be unionized could be due to
these wo·rkers being more likely to choose jobs in the union sector or due to
unionized employers choosing from the pool ofapplicants (for a job at a given
wage) those with the most qualifications.
The problem here is one of identification. It is difficult to determine from
observations on the union status ofindividual workers and such employee and
employer characteristics as age, education, and establishment size the sepa-
rate influences of the choices made by workers, employers, and union orga-
nizers. The additional information used here-as in Farber (1983, 1990)-is
a measure of the desire for union representation by currently unorganized
workers.
An individual worker will desire union representation if the expected net
benefit ofa union job is positive. Let z; be the difference between the expected
utility of a union and nonunion job for individual i. This (unobserved) utility
gain or loss depends on certain observable and unobservable variables, includ-
ing the wage differential between union and otherwise similar nonunion jobs.
(1)
Let DES; be a discrete variable that takes on a value of unity for individuals
who prefer union status and zero for individuals who prefer nonunion status.
Then
(2) Prob(DES; = 1) = Prob(z; > 0) = Prob(u; > - X;b).
If it is known which individuals prefer to be unionized, the parameters in
equation (2) can be estimated.
In most microdata sets only the union status of individual workers is ob-
served. Let US; = 1 for individuals in the union sector and US; = 0 for non-
3. The methodology is due to Farber (1983) and was used by Farber (1990) to examine changes
over time in the demand for and supply ofunionization in the United States.118 W. Craig Riddell
union workers. If individuals have sorted themselves into the sectors of their
choice, then it would be the case that
(3) Prob(US; = 1) = Prob(z; > 0) = Prob(u; > - X;b).
In this case the parameters determining the demand for unionization could be
estimated with information on union status alone.
However, there are several reasons to expect that not all individuals who
prefer a union job will in fact be represented by a union. It may be costly for
an individual worker to initiate or help organize a union organizing drive,
especially ifthe employer attempts to dissuade employees from attempting to
organize. Thus even ifthe expected net benefits from union representation are
positive, these may become negative when the costs of organizing the work-
place are taken into account. In addition, not all the benefits of collective
representation accrue to those employees who make the investment in orga-
nizing a union; some accrue to existing employees who "free ride" (i.e., do
not participate in the organizing drive), while others accrue to future em-
ployees. Thus there may be workplaces that remain nonunion even though a
majority of current and future employees would prefer collective representa-
tion in the absence oforganizing costs.
There may also be workplaces in which a minority ofthe current employees
prefer union status. In this case the workplace would remain nonunion even
in the absence of organizing costs. If it were costless to change jobs, those
employees who prefer union jobs would leave. Changing jobs is often not
costless, however, especially when workers have considerable specific human
capital. Thus an unsatisfied demand for union representation may remain in
nonunion firms.
Ifunion organizing is costly to individual employees, which is particularly
likely when employers adopt strong anti-union strategies, a queue for high-
paying union jobs will emerge-even in a situation offull employment.4 Evi-
dence that such queues exist in the United States is provided in studies by
Abowd and Farber (1982) and Farber (1983). In these circumstances, union
status is determined not only by the preferences ofthe individual worker (i.e.,
whether z; > 0) but also by which individuals are chosen from the pool of
applicants by the unionized employer.5 Thus there will be individuals in the
nonunion sector (US; = 0) who would prefer a union job (DES; = 1).
Comparative evidence on the significance of this "unsatisfied demand" for
union representation can be obtained from two surveys sponsored by union
federations in the United States and Canada. The first, referred to here as the
4. Ofcourse, there may be periods in which there are queues for most jobs, but that is another
issue.
5. This discussion assumes that hiring decisions are made by the employer-by far the most
common arrangement in North America. The analysis would need to be modified for situations in
which employment decisions are made using union hiring halls.119 Unionization in Canada and the United States
AFL survey, was conducted in 1984 by Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., for
the American Federation ofLabor-Congress ofIndustrial Organizations.6 The
second, referred to here as the CFL survey, was carried out in 1990 by Decima
Research for the Canadian Federation of Labour/Federation Canadienne du
Travail.
Both surveys ask respondents about their union status. Unorganized work-
ers are also asked about their desire for union representation. However, indi-
viduals who are currently members of a union or covered by a collective
agreement are not asked whether they would prefer their job to be nonunion.
Thus US; is observed for all respondents, and DES; is observed for workers in
the nonunion sector.
Although the AFL and CFL surveys are similar in a number of respects,
three differences limit our ability to draw strong conclusions from a compara-
tive analysis. First is the time lag between the two surveys. In effect the anal-
ysis represents a comparison between the United States in 1984 and Canada
in 1990. Because union coverage was declining in both countries during the
1984-90period, this comparison will overstate the Canadian-U.S. differential
in 1990.
The two surveys were also conducted during very different phases of the
business cycle in the two countries. The 1984 AFL survey was conducted at a
time when the U.S. economy was just past the trough of a major recession,
while the February 1990 CFL survey was carried out just prior to the peak of
the 1983-90 business cycle in Canada.
The third factor involves differences between the two surveys in the critical
(for this analysis) question ofthe desire for union representation among unor-
ganized workers. The U.S. question is, for the purpose of this analysis, very
precise: "Ifan election were held tomorrow to decide whether your workplace
would be unionized ornot, do you think you would definitely vote for a union,
probably vote for a union, probably vote against a union, or definitely vote
against a union?" Individuals who responded that they would definitely or
probably vote for a union are assigned DES; = 1, and those who responded
that they would definitely or probably vote against a union are assigned
DES; = O.
The Canadian question was, "Thinking about your own needs, and your
current employment situation and expectations, would you say that it is very
likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not likely at all that you would
considerjoining or associating yourselfwith a union or a professional associa-
tion in the future?" Individuals who responded "somewhat likely" or "very
likely" are assigned DES; = 1, and those who responded "not very likely" or
"not likely at all" are assigned DES; = o.
The measurement ofthe desire for collective representation among unorga-
6. See Farber (1990) for a more detailed discussion and analysis ofthis survey.120 W. Craig Riddell
nized workers differs between the two surveys in two ways. One is the actual
phrasing of the key question. 7 The CFL question is somewhat broader and
vaguer and could be interpreted to involve a job other than the job currently
held, whereas the AFL question is both precise and clearly focused on the
existing job. For those not currently employed, the CFL question could be
interpreted as asking about whether their job search will be focused on the
union or nonunion sector. This difference in focus is not a problem in this
paper because the analysis is restricted to those currently employed. Nonethe-
less, even among those currently employed, the CFL question may measure a
somewhat broader concept ofthe desire for collective representation than does
the AFL survey, which is more narrowly focused on the current job. The fact
that the Canadian question is less precise may also bias the responses, al-
though the direction ofbias is unclear.
The second difference is that the AFL question was asked of all those not
currently union members, whereas the CFL survey was structured such that
this question was asked only ofthose not members of a union or professional
association. Thus the concept of collective representation in the CFL survey
is broader (those members ofa union or professional association), and accord-
ingly the question is only asked ofa narrower group (those not members of a
union or professional association).8
These two differences between the surveys may offset each other. The CFL
question on the desire for collective representation is somewhat broader,
which may result in a larger measured desire for union representation. The
CFL question is asked of a narrower group, which will tend to reduce the
measured desire for collective representation among the currently unorga-
nized.
The two surveys differ in another respect. The CFL survey was designed to
yield a representative sample of the Canadian labor force, whereas the AFL
"quota sampled" union members because its primary purpose was to assess
the attitudes ofnonunion workers. Thus nonunion workers were oversampled
(by about 10 percent) in the AFL survey. I deal with this in the same fashion
as Farber (1990), by randomly omitting 10 percent of the observations on
nonunion workers.
A feature common to the two surveys is that union members (and members
of professional associations in the case of the CFL survey) were not asked if
they would prefer a nonunion job. Because union representation is a majority
decision, there may be some individuals covered by a collective agreement
who would prefer nonunion status. The number of such individuals is un-
7. It is important to point out that, because union certification decisions in most Canadian
jurisdictions are not based on voting, the U.S. question would probably not be appropriate in
Canada even ifboth surveys were intending to measure the same phenomenon.
8. Unfortunately it is not possible to separate union members from members of professional
associations because some workers report belonging to both. Furthermore, the critical question
on the desire for union representation is only asked ofthose not members ofeither.121 Unionization in Canada and the United States
known, but their treatment in the same fashion by the two surveys should not
significantly affect the comparative analysis.
As in Farber (1983, 1990), I assume DES; = 1for all those with US; = 1.
Excluded from the analysis are those not currently employed, the self-
employed, managers, and those who did not respond to the questions on union
status, desire for union representation, public or private sector employment,
and demographic variables common to the two surveys (age, education, sex).
After these exclusions and the adjustment to the AFL survey for quota sam-
pling, there are 517 observations from the CFL survey (out of 1,000 inter-
views) and 890 observations from the AFL survey (out of 1,452 interviews).
Some of the key statistics are summarized in table 4.3. The top part of the
table shows these statistics for each ofthe full samples while the bottom part
splits the samples into the public and private sectors.
These surveys confirm that the probability that a randomly selected Cana-
dian worker is unionized is more than double that of a U.S. worker (0.48
versus 0.22). To some extent this differential is overstated by the inclusion of
members ofprofessional associations in the Canadian data but not in the U.S.
data.9 The remainder of this large differential can be accounted for by three
factors. First, the desire for union representation in Canada is about 28 percent
higher than that in the United States (Prob(DES; = 1) of 0.64 versus 0.50).
There is also less unsatisfied demand for union status in Canada;
Prob(DES; = IIUS; = 0) is 0.30 in Canada versus 0.36 in the United States.
However, the most remarkable difference between the two countries is clearly
the greater supply of unionization conditional on desire for union status;
Prob(US; = 1IDES; = 1) is 0.76 in Canada versus 0.44 in the United States,
that is, 73 percent higher in Canada. These summary statistics indicate that
Canada's higher union density is due to both greater demand for and greater
supply of union coverage in Canada, but that intercountry differences in the
supply ofunion representation appear to be relatively more significant.
In order to assess the relative importance ofdemand and supply factors, the
relationship Prob(US; = 1) = Prob(US; = 1IDES; = 1) * Prob(DES; = 1)
can be decomposed into two components corresponding to differences in the
demand for and supply ofunionization:
~Prob(US; = 1) = ~Prob(DES; = 1) * Prob(US; = 1IDES; = 1)
(4) + Prob(DES; = 1) * ~Prob(US; = 1IDES; 1)
0.14 * 0.6 + 0.565 * 0.32
.084 + .181 = 0.265,
9. Union membership as a percentage ofpaid workers was 37 percent in Canada in 1984 and 16
percent in the United States in 1990, a differential of 21 percentage points. Collective agreement
coverage as a percentage ofpaid workers was 42 percent in Canada in 1984 and 18 percent in the
United States in 1990, a differential of 24 percentage points. The sources for these statistics are
the surveys reported in table 4.2.122 W. Craig Riddell
Table 4.3 AFL and CFL Surveys ofDesire for Union Representation





Prob (US; = 1) 0.48 0.22
Prob (DES; = 1) 0.64 0.50
Prob (DES; = 11US; = 0) 0.30 0.36
Prob (US; = 1IDES; = l) 0.76 0.44
CFL Survey AFL Survey
Public Private Public Private
Number ofobservations
Union 125 125 63 133
Nonunion 54 213 153 541
Total 179 338 216 674
Prob (US; = 1) 0.70 0.37 0.29 0.20
Prob (DES; = 1) 0.84 0.54 0.62 0.45
Prob (DES; = 11US; = 0) 0.46 0.26 0.46 0.31
Prob (US; = IIDES; = 1) 0.83 0.69 0.47 0.44
where d Prob(US; = 1) = 0.26 is the difference between the unionization
rate in Canada and that in the United States, d Prob(DES; = 1) = 0.14 and
d Prob(US; = 1IDES; = 1) = 0.32 are Canadian minus U.S. differences,
and Prob(US; = 1IDES; = 1) = 0.60 and Prob(DES; = 1) = 0.565 are
averages ofthe U.S. and Canadian levels. 10
This decomposition implies that about t~o-thirds of the Canada-U.S. dif-
ferential in union coverage is due to the difference in the supply of union
representation (the second term in the above decomposition) and one-third to
differences between Canada and the United States in the demand for union
representation (the first term). II
Both the CFL and AFL surveys permit identification of public versus pri-
vate sector respondents, and the bottom part of table 4.3 contains the same
analysis for the private and public sectors separately. This analysis is worth-
while for two reasons. Explanations of Canadian-U.S. differences in the ex-
tent ofunion organization have often stressed the relative importance ofCan-
10. Evaluating the approximation at the averages ofthe U.S. and Canadian levels gave a smaller
approximation error than did using eithercountry as the base.
II. In a recent contribution, Farber and Krueger (1992) employ an alternative decomposition:
Prob(US; = 1) = Prob(DES; = 1) - Prob(DES; = 1 and US; = 0). The first term constitutes
intercountry differences in demand and the second intercountry differences in "inverse supply," or
the amount of unsatisfied demand for union representation as a fraction ofthe entire labor force.
This decomposition attributes 0.14 (or 54 percent) ofthe intercountry unionization differential of
0.26 to differences in demand and 0.12 (or 46 percent) to differences in inverse supply.123 Unionization in Canada and the United States
ada's public sector (Meltz 1985; Troy 1990). In addition, some explanations
ofthe decline in unionization in the United States imply different outcomes in
the U.S. private and public sectors (Freeman 1986, 1988).
The two surveys differ in their questions about public sector status. The
AFL survey asked, "Do you work for federal, state or local government?"
Those who answered yes are regarded in what follows as being in the public
sector; the remainder are treated as being in the private sector. The CFL survey
asked, "Do you work in a large business, small business, or the public sec-
tor?" Thus the meaning of"public sector" in the Canadian survey is both self-
reported and potentially broader than that offederal, provincial, or local gov-
ernment employment. As discussed in more detail later, the broader notion of
public sector in Canada is to an important extent an appropriate reflection of
the greater government involvement in the Canadian economy. However, the
differences between the two surveys in this respect also imply that caution is
appropriate in interpreting the results.
According to these surveys, the Canada-U.S. unionization gap is larger in
the public than in the private sector; a Canadian public sector worker is more
than twice as likely to be unionized than the U.S. counterpart, whereas a Ca-
nadian private sector worker is somewhat less than twice as likely to be cov-
ered by a collective agreement (table 4.3).12 These differences in the extent of
union organization can be attributed in part to a greater demand for union
representation in Canada; Prob(DES; = 1) is 35 and 20 percent higher in the
Canadian public and private sectors, respectively. There is also less unsatisfied
demand for union representation in the Canadian private sector than in the
U.S. However, it is interesting to note that the amount ofunsatisfied demand
for unionization is the same in the Canadian and U.S. public sectors. In both
sectors, the largest relative intercountry differences are those related to supply
conditional on demand; Prob(US; = 1IDES; = 1) is 77 and 57 percent
greater in the Canadian public and private sectors, respectively.
As before, decomposition (4) can be used to indicate the relative impor-
tance of demand and supply factors. This decomposition attributes 0.05 (or
29 percent) ofthe 0.17 private sector differential to the demand side and 0.12
(or 71 percent) to the supply side. In the public sector the contributions ofthe
demand and supply components are 35 and 65 percent, respectively.
Thus the conclusion that about two-thirds ofthe Canada-U.S. unionization
gap is associated with intercountry differences in supply conditional on de-
mand continues to hold when one disaggregates into the public and private
sectors.
These general findings also continue to hold after controlling for individual
characteristics such as gender, age, and education. These results are shown in
tables 4.4 and 4.5. In table 4.4 the dependent variable is DES;; the estimated
12. Intercountry differences in unionization in the public and private sectors are examined in
detail later, using comparable surveys that are representative ofthe respective labor forces.124 W. Craig Riddell
Table 4.4 Probit Model ofDemand for Unionization
Variable AFL CFL Pooled
Constant -0.14 -0.34 -0.35
(-0.5) (-0.9) (- 1.6)
Male 0.13 0.16 0.14
(1.6) (1.4) (2.0)
Age 25-34 0.12 -0.13 0.02
(0.9) (-0.7) (0.2)
Age 35-44 0.14 0.32 0.21
(1.0) (1.5) (1.9)
Age 45-54 0.08 0.22 0.15
(0.5) (1.0) (1.2)
Age 55-64 0.16 0.30 0.21
(0.9) (1.1) (1.4)
Age 65+ -0.03 -0.35 -0.18
(-0.1) (-0.7) (-0.6)
Some high school 0.28 0.30 0.23
(1.0) (0.9) (1.1)
High school graduate 0.17 0.49 0.31
(0.7) (1.5) (1.6)
Some college -0.17 0.57 0.13
(-0.6) (1.7) (0.6)
Some university -0.24 0.34 -0.0
(-0.8) (0.9) (-0.0)




N 890 536 1426
Correctly predicted (%) 59 63 59
relationship can thus be interpreted as the demand for unionization. In table
4.5 the dependent variable is US; (conditional on DES); this estimated rela-
tionship can thus be interpreted as the supply ofunionization function. These
demand and supply functions are estimated for each country separately and
for the pooled sample. The latter includes a dummy variable for the Canadian
observations. The control variables are individual characteristics observed in
both surveys (gender, age, and education).!3
Males are more likely to desire union status in both countries, as is also the
case for individuals between 35 and 44 years of age. Otherwise, the demand
for collective representation is independent of personal characteristics. When
the observations from both countries are pooled, the probability of desiring
13. The age and education groups were adjusted to make them comparable in the two surveys.125 Unionization in Canada and the United States
Table 4.5 Probit Model ofSupply ofUnionization
Variable AFL CFL Pooled
Constant -1.71 -0.02 -1.32
(-4.1) (-0.0) (-4.0)
Male 0.60 0.06 0.39
(4.7) (0.4) (4.0)
Age 25-34 0.62 0.60 0.59
(3.0) (2.3) (3.7)
Age 35-44 0.88 0.60 0.73
(4.0) (2.3) (4.4)
Age 45-54 0.79 1.10 0.89
(3.4) (3.4) (4.8)
Age 55-64 1.33 1.38 1.30
(4.8) (3.4) (5.9)
Age 65+ -5.09 5.59 0.15
(-0.0) (0.0) (0.3)
Some high school 0.70 -0.37 0.17
(1.7) (-0.6) (0.5)
High school graduate 0.51 0.10 0.30
(1.3) (0.2) (1.0)
Some college 0.50 0.35 0.42
(1.2) (0.5) (1.3)
Some university 0.15 -0.17 0.06
(0.3) (-0.3) (0.2)




N 443 339 782
Correctly predicted (%) 65 77 69
unionization is 0.33 higher in Canada than in the United States, a difference
that is statistically significant. 14
The supply of union representation (conditional on demand) depends on
two individual characteristics: gender and age. Among those who desire
unionization, males are more likely to achieve this status in the United States
but not in Canada. Individuals between the ages of 25 and 64 who desire
collective representation are more likely to achieve union status than are
younger workers (16-24-year-olds). Educational attainment has little impact
on the supply ofunionization in either country.
The most striking result in table 4.5 is that the probability that a Canadian
14. Adding interaction terms to allow the slope coefficients to differ between Canada and the
United States makes little difference to the estimates in table 4.4. Only the university graduate
coefficient differs significantly between Canada and the United States.126 W. Craig Riddell
worker who desires union status will in fact be unionized is 0.84 higher than
the equivalent likelihood for an American worker. This finding reinforces the
conclusion based on the sample averages in table 4.3: although both the de-
mand for and supply ofunion representation is higher in Canada, intercountry
differences in supply (given the desire for union coverage) are relatively
greater than are intercountry differences in demand.
These demand and supply relationships were also estimated separately for
the public and private sectors. Appendix tables 4A.l and 4A.2 contain these
estimates. The main finding continues to hold: supply-side differences be-
tween Canada and the United States are relatively larger than demand-side
differences. These differences are especially large in the private sector. In the
pooled sample, the probability of demanding union representation is 0.19
higher in Canada than in the United States (controlling for gender, age, and
educational status). In contrast, the probability of being unionized, condi-
tional on desiring union status, is 0.67 higher in the Canadian private sector.
I interpret the results of this demand-supply analysis as providing some-
albeit modest-support for the hypothesis that differences between Canada
and the United States in the laws governing union organization and collective
bargaining, and the administration and enforcement of these laws, together
with less overt management opposition to unions in Canada are important
factors accounting for the intercountry differential in union coverage. The
more favorable legal and administrative environment and less management
opposition (itself possibly due to the differences in laws and their enforce-
ment) reduce the cost to workers ofunion representation, resulting in greater
demand even if the underlying preferences of workers on both sides of the
border are otherwise identical on average. These same factors also lower the
costs to union leaders and organizers of union formation, member represen-
tation, and contract administration, thus increasing the supply of unioniza-
tion. These implications ofthe hypothesis are consistent with the evidence in
this section.
Other explanations of the unionization gap are less easily reconciled with
this evidence. Strictly interpreted, explanations based on differences in the
structures of the economies and labor forces would imply that intercountry
differences in demand and supply would disappear upon controlling for indi-
vidual and employer characteristics. This clearly does not happen, although
admittedly the controls available on a comparable basis are far from compre-
hensive. Similarly, a pure demand-side explanation (for example, because Ca-
nadian workers have stronger underlying preferences for collective forms of
representation) is difficult to reconcile with the apparent relative significance
of supply considerations (conditional on demand) and the lower excess de-
mand for union coverage in Canada.
The support for the "legal regime/management opposition" view is modest
for two reasons. First, the link between the hypothesis and the finding that the
intercountry unionization gap is due to greater Canadian demand for and sup-127 Unionization in Canada and the United States
ply of unionization is clearly indirect. Second, the two surveys used in this
section differ in several potentially significant ways, as described above. More
convincing comparative evidence requires better data. 15 The analysis to which
I now tum meets this requirement.
4.4 Structural Explanations
As noted earlier, many ofthe changes that have been occurring in the struc-
ture ofthe economy and the labor force-away from employment that is pre-
dominantly full-time, blue-collar, male, in large firms or enterprises, and in
manufacturing or primary industries, toward employment that is increasingly
part-time, white-collar, female, in small firms or enterprises, and in service
industries-represent shifts from sectors that are typically highly unionized
to sectors that have generally been characterized by low degrees of unioniza-
tion. In the United States there has also been a relative shift of employment
away from the highly unionized North to the less unionized South. The only
significant development tending to increase the extent of unionization is the
relative growth in employment-together with the substantial increase in
union density-in the public sector.
Although some studies have concluded that these changes in labor force
composition contributed to the decline in unionization in the United States
(Dickens and Leonard 1985; Farber 1985, 1990), this "structuralist" view has
been challenged because many of the same compositional changes have also
occurred in Canada, where union density continued to increase until the mid-
1980s (Lipset 1986; Freeman 1988). However, Troy (1990, 1992) has argued
that structural changes have indeed led to a decline in private sector unioniza-
tion in both countries, albeit one that occurred later in Canada because of
differences in the timing ofkey changes in economic structure (e.g., the shift
from manufacturing and primary industries to services). Troy's analysis is
based on data on unionization by industry-data that have important limita-
tions. This section provides an analysis of the structuralist hypothesis using
comparable microdata from both countries. In particular, I examine the extent
to which differences in the composition of the respective labor forces can ac-
count for intercountry differences in the extent ofunionization.
The data come from very similar surveys carried out at the same time (De-
cember 1984) in each country. The Canadian data source is the Survey of
Union Membership (SUM), carried out as a supplement to the LFS, and the
U.S. source is the CPS earnings file, a supplement to the CPS. These data
sources were chosen for three main reasons. First, the LFS and CPS are
15. Farber and Krueger (1992) carried out a survey of U.S. workers' attitudes toward union
representation. They asked both the CFL and AFL questions and in half the survey randomly
reversed the order in which the two questions were asked. They find that the responses are very
sensitive to the order in which the questions are asked. These results indicate another reason for
caution in interpreting the results ofthe comparative demand-supply analysis.128 W. Craig Riddell
monthly household surveys that are very similar in terms of their underlying
methodology and structure. Furthermore, the supplements have almost iden-
tical questions relating to union membership and collective agreement cover-
age. For the purposes at hand, collective agreement coverage is the preferred
measure ofunion status and is accordingly used throughout; however, none of
the qualitative conclusions would be altered by the use ofunion membership.
Second, both surveys provide information on whether each paid worker is
employed in the private orthe public sector. The concept ofpublic sector used
here is a broad one-corresponding to whether the employing organization is
owned or primarily financed by government-and the two surveys use a very
similar methodology for classifying workers into paid public and paid private
employment. 16 Later Canadian surveys that provide information on union sta-
tus (for example, the Labour Market Activity Surveys of 1986-90) do not,
unfortunately, provide this information on public-private sector status. The
third reason for choosing these sources is that both provide, when the data are
appropriately weighted, representative samples of the respective labor
forces. I?
As discussed previously, union status is determined by the decisions made
by individual workers, employers, and union leaders and organizers. Let
(5) {if Yij > 0,
USij = 1 0 otherwise, j = C,U,
where C and u refer to Canada and the United States, respectively, and
(6) j = C,u.
Equation (5) is a reduced-form equation that reflects the combined outcome
of demand and supply factors on union status. Yij is an unobserved variable
that incorporates the net utility gain ofunion coverage to worker i (Zi in equa-
tion [1]) in addition to influences ofemployer and union-organizer behavior.
Qij are variables that influence unionization decisions, and dj is the associated
parameter vector. The error term eij is assumed to be normally distributed, so
the parameters dj can be estimated by a probit model.
The variables available on a comparable basis for both countries are gender,
age, part-time employment, public sector employment, occupation, and in-
dustry. Table 4.6 reports the sample means of these variables for the two
samples, together with the estimated parameters dr
18 Excluded from the em-
16. The LFS definition ofpaid workers (government) is "those who work for a local, provincial
or federal government, for a government service or agency, a crown corporation, ora government
owned public establishment such as a school or hospital" (Statistics Canada 1992b, 12). This
coding takes place at the same time as industry and occupation coding. The CPS definition is also
based on government ownership. Paid government employees are coded by the interviewer; fed-
eral, state, and local employees are identified separately. See Bureau of Labour Statistics, CPS
Interviewers Manual, item 23E.
17. Unless otherwise noted, the analysis in this paper uses the weighted data.
18. The Canadian sample of3,995 observations is a one-eighth random subsample ofthe SUM
(after exclusions noted), while the U.S. sample of4,372 observations is a one-third random sub-
sample ofthe December 1984 CPS earnings file (after exclusions).Table 4.6 Determinants ofUnionization in Canada and the United States, 1984
Canada U.S.
Sample Parameter Sample Parameter Interaction
Means Estimates Means Estimates Terms
Constant 1.00 -1.45 1.00 -1.74 0.29
(-9.1) (-8.1) (1.1)
Female 0.45 -0.15 0.47 -0.11 -0.04
(-2.8) (-2.0) (-0.5)
Age 25-34 0.31 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.11
(5.9) (3.7) (1.0)
Age 35-44 0.24 0.53 0.22 0.51 0.02
(7.2) (6.1) (0.2)
Age 45-54 0.15 0.48 0.14 0.64 -0.16
(5.9) (7.2) (- 1.3)
Age 55-64 0.08 0.42 0.10 0.33 0.08
(4.4) (3.3) (0.6)
Age 65 + 0.005 -0.34 0.03 -0.06 -0.28
(-0.8) (-0.3) (-0.6)
Part-time 0.16 -0.33 0.20 -0.41 0.08
(-4.7) (-5.2) (0.7)
Public 0.23 0.99 0.17 0.94 0.06
(12.3) (11.3) (0.5)
Clerical 0.19 0.40 0.17 0.13 0.27
(5.2) (1.6) (2.4)
Sales 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.03
(0.6) (0.3) (0.2)
Serving 0.14 0.56 0.14 0.31 0.25
(6.3) (3.5) (2.0)
Primary 0.02 0.57 0.02 -0.41 0.98
(2.9) (- 1.4) (2.8)
Processing 0.21 0.96 0.20 0.70 0.26
(11.9) (8.7) (2.3)
Transportation, handling 0.08 0.80 0.09 0.66 0.14
(8.2) (6.9) (1.0)
Manufacturing 0.21 0.40 0.21 0.29 0.11
(2.7) (1.4) (0.4)
Construction 0.04 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.04
(0.7) (0.4) (0.1)
Transportation, communication, 0.09 0.76 0.07 0.79 -0.02
utilities (4.7) (3.7) (-0.1)
Trade 0.16 -0.06 0.21 -0.26 0.20
(-0.4) (- 1.2) (0.8)
Finance, insurance, real estate 0.05 -0.53 0.06 -0.59 0.07
(-2.7) (-2.3) (0.2)
Education, health 0.19 1.22 0.21 0.22 1.00
(7.8) (1.0) (3.8)
Other services 0.14 -0.23 0.10 -0.05 -0.18
(- 1.4) (-0.2) (-0.7)
Public administration 0.08 0.59 0.05 -0.06 0.65
(3.3) (-0.3) (2.2)
R2 (Cragg-Uhler) 0.42 0.28 0.42
N 3,995 4,372 8,367130 W. Craig Riddell
pirical analysis are those who are not paid workers (e.g., the self-employed
and unpaid family workers), those not employed in the reference week, and
those for whom information on variables ofinterest was missing.
Although the two labor forces are clearly very similar, some differences are
evident. The proportion of females in the labor force is somewhat higher in
the United States, as is that ofpart-time workers. More ofthe Canadian labor
force is under age 55. Public sector employment is substantially higher in
Canada (23 percent versus 17 percent in the United States), an aspect exam-
ined in more detail below. The occupational distribution of employment is
remarkably similar, the only noticeable difference at this level of aggregation
being the larger proportion ofthe U.S. labor force in sales occupations. There
are a number of differences in the industrial distribution of employment, al-
though none of these could be described as dramatic. More of the Canadian
labor force is employed in transportation, communication, and utilities, pub-
lic administration, and services, while more of the U.S. labor force is em-
ployed in construction and trade.
A number ofthe estimated parameters are also quite similar across the two
countries. However, there are several notable exceptions. The difference in
the respective constant terms indicates that the same individual would be 0.29
more likely to be covered by a collective agreement in Canada than in the
United States. Public sector workers are much more likely to be unionized
in both countries, but the impact of public sector status on the probabil-
ity of unionization is almost identical in each country. The effects of age,
gender, and part-time employment are also very similar in the two coun-
tries. However, several ofthe industry and occupation coefficients differ sub-
stantially.
In order to examine these differences more systematically, the two samples
were pooled and a Canada dummy (equal to unity for observations from Can-
ada and zero otherwise) was interacted with each ofthe Qvariables. 19 The last
column oftable 4.6 reports the estimated interaction terms. The only signifi-
cant differences are in the impacts ofthe occupational and industrial distribu-
tions, the probability of unionization being higher in Canada (other things
being equal) in clerical, serving, primary, and processing occupations and in
education and health and public administration. Each of these differences is
positive; the largest differences are those associated with the coefficients of
the education and health industry and ofprimary occupations.
How much ofthe Canada-U.S. unionization differential can be attributed to
differences in the characteristics ofthe respective labor forces and how much
to differences between the two countries in the likelihood ofa worker with the
same set ofcharacteristics being unionized? In order to address this question,
19. When the data are weighted, the Canadian observations constitute 14 percent ofthe pooled
sample. For this analysis, it is more appropriate to have equal numbers ofobservations from each
country; thus the weights are scaled so that halfofthe observations come from each country_131 Unionization in Canada and the United States
the intercountry gap in the probability of union coverage is decomposed into
two terms, one associated with intercountry differences in the characteristics
of the respective labor forces, and the second with differences in the impacts
of those characteristics on the probability of unionization. 20 Let h(.) denote
the value ofthe standard normal distribution at (.). The estimated probability
that individual i ofcountryj is covered by a collective agreement is
(7) j = C,U.
The average estimated probability ofunionization in each country is given by
(8) P j = IINj L h(Q;j d j),
;
j = C,U,
where Nj is the number ofobservations for countryj. Define
(9)
Po is the U.S. union density that would be predicted if each U.S. worker re-
tained his or her unionization-determining characteristics but the impacts of
those characteristics on the probability of union coverage were those esti-
mated for Canadians. The intercountry unionization gap can then be decom-
posed into two terms, the first representing the portion of the gap associated
with intercountry differences in characteristics that influence union status and
the second associated with differences in the impacts of those characteristics
on the probability ofunion coverage:
(10)
This decomposition is shown in column 2 of table 4.7. The average pre-
dicted union densities equal the actual densities for each country; thus the
predicted gap equals the actual gap (0.26). Eighty-five percent of the gap
(0.22 of 0.26) is associated with intercountry differences in the parameter
vectors, and only 15 percent is associated with intercountry differences in the
characteristics ofthe respective labor forces.
An alternative, and simpler, procedure decomposes the unionization differ-
ential at the mean of the data; thatis, for the individual with average charac-
teristics for each country (denoted by Qcand Qu)'
(11) h(Qcd) - h(Qu du) = {h(Qc d) - h(Qu d)}
+ {h(Qu d) - h(Qu du)·
20. The procedures outlined below involve decomposing a nonlinear function in a fashion sim-
ilar to the Oaxaca type ofdecomposition ofa linear relationship. See Even and Macpherson (1993)
and Doiron and Riddell (1993) for details ofthese procedures and their application to male-female
earnings differences.132 W. Craig Riddell
Table 4.7 Decomposition ofthe Canada-U.S. Unionization Differential
A. Overall decomposition
Total Economy Private Sector Public Sector
Actuala Predictedb Actuala Predictedb Actuala Predictedb
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Canada 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.81 0.81 0.83
United States 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.41 0.41 0.39
Unionization differential 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.40 0.44
Approximated gape 0.27
Approximation error 0.02
Due to differences in 0.04 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.02
characteristics (%) (15) (13) (0) (0) (5) (5)
Due to differences in impacts 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.38 0.42
ofcharacteristics (%) (85) (87) (100) (000) (95) (95)
B. Contribution ofeach variable to the Canada-U.S. unionization differential
Due to Due to Returns
Variable Characteristics to Characteristics Due to Both
Constant 0 .088 .088
Age .006 .005 .011
Gender .001 -.006 -.005
Part-time .005 .005 .010
Public sector .019 .003 .022
Occupation .002 .052 .054
Industry .002 .092 .094
Total .035 .239 .274
Percentage 13 87 100
aSample average using weighted data.
bColumn 2 predicted using the method shown in equation (7). Column 3 predicted at the mean of the
data in each country (method shown in equation [11]).
eBased on a Taylor series approximation to equation (11).
The results of this decomposition are shown in column 3 of part A of table
4.7.
21 The conclusions are very similar: 83 percent ofthe Canada-U.S. union-
ization gap is attributed to intercountry differences in the parameters affecting
the probability ofunionization_and only 17 percent to differences in the char-
acteristics ofthe respective labor forces.
Associated with this simpler decomposition is a straightforward procedure
21. Note that this method underpredicts the extent ofunionization in both countries. The extent
of underprediction is greatest for the United States, so the predicted gap is underestimated. The
difference between the two methods is a function ofthe degree ofnonlinearity in the probit func-
tion. The U.S. union density is underpredicted more because ofthe greater degree ofnonlinearity
in the probit function at low levels ofunionization.133 Unionization in Canada and the United States
for assessing the contribution ofeach variable. 22 These breakdowns are shown
in part B oftable 4.7. Although the Canadian labor force has more ofeach of
the characteristics that make unionization likely, the only characteristic that
makes a substantial contribution to the gap in union coverage is public sector
employment, which accounts for .019 (or 6.9 percent) ofthe gap.
All of the estimated probit coefficients except gender contribute to a wid-
ening of the intercountry gap in union coverage. However, about 85 percent
of the gap is associated with three sets of coefficients: industrial composition
(34 percent), the constant term (32 percent), and occupational distribution (19
percent). Thus about one-third of the intercountry unionization differential
can be accounted for by the fact that an individual with the same characteris-
tics is 0.29 more likely to be covered by a collective agreement in Canada. An
additional half (34 percent + 19 percent) of the gap can be attributed to the
fact that workers employed in particular industries and occupations in Canada
are more likely to be unionized than are U.S. workers with the same personal
characteristics employed in those industries and occupations. Finally, almost
7 percent ofthe gap is associated with the fact that more ofthe Canadian labor
force is employed in the public sector (broadly defined).
In summary, this analysis indicates that the structuralist hypothesis explains
very little of the Canada-U.S. unionization differential. Differences in the
structure of the respective labor forces account for about 15 percent of the
differential; the remaining 85 percent is due to the greater likelihood of union
coverage of a Canadian worker with a given set of characteristics. The only
structural difference that makes a significant contribution to the unionization
gap is the greater extent ofpublic sector employment in Canada, a feature that
is now examined in more detail.
4.5 Private versus Public Sector Differences
From part B oftable 4.7, the total contribution ofthe public sector employ-
ment variable is .022, or 8.0 percent, of the Canada-U.S. unionization gap.
Most ofthis contribution (6.9 percent) is associated with the larger fraction of
Canada's labor force employed in the public sector; the remaining 1.1 percent
arises because, other things being equal, Canadian public sector employees
are slightly more likely to be unionized than their U.S. counterparts. Despite
the evident conclusion that the search for greater understanding of the inter-
country unionization gap should be focused elsewhere, there are several rea-
sons why a more detailed examination of public-private sector differences is
22. See Doiron and Riddell (1993). The procedure involves a Taylor series approximation to
the left-hand side of equation (11). The approximation error is shown in table 4.7. The Taylor
series approximation was evaluated at the mean ofthe Canadian and U.S. union densities. Evalu-
ating the approximation at either the Canadian or the U.S. level resulted in substantially larger
approximation errors.134 W. Craig Riddell
worthwhile. Perhaps the most important reason is simply that many observers
believe that a substantial amount of the unionization differential is associated
with intercountry differences in the importance ofthe public sector and in the
relationship between the public sector and unionization.
In addition, in both countries the public sector has been in recent decades
the main source of growth in unionization, in contrast to the private sector,
where union density has either grown slowly ordeclined. A full understanding
of intercountry differences in the role of collective bargaining requires an
analysis ofeach country's public and private sectors.
Unfortunately, the publicly available data make it difficult to analyze this
issue. Data are available on employment and unionization by industry. How-
ever, outside ofpublic administration (which is entirely in the public sector in
each country), both publicly and privately owned enterprises coexist in many
industries-especially in Canada, where federal and provincial governments
have numerous Crown corporations operating in industries such as transpor-
tation, communications, and natural resource exploration and extraction
(Economic Council ofCanada, 1986). Researchers have dealt with this prob-
lem by making various adjustments to the published data, adjustments that are
clearly imperfect.23
The problems associated with data on unionization by industry can be over-
come by the use of microdata in which both public-private sector status and
union status are observed. The two surveys described above (SUM and CPS
earnings file) provide comparable measures ofunion status and public versus
private sector employment in the two countries as ofDecember 1984.
Table 4.8 shows the percentage of employed paid workers in the public
sector in each country by gender, full-time and part-time employment, occu-
pation, and industry. Overall, 23 percent of paid workers are in the public
sector in Canada versus 18 percent in the United States. 24 Public sector em-
ployment in Canada is particularly more significant in the transportation,
communication and utilities, and finance, insurance, and real estate industries
and in the transportation and moving and managerial, professional, and tech-
nical occupations. Differences between the two countries in the amount of
public sector employment in the education, health, and welfare industries are
not large. Table 4.8 also highlights the dangers associated with public versus
private sector breakdowns based on industry classifications. In both Canada
and the United States, many industries contain a mixture ofpublicly and pri-
vately owned enterprises.
23. For example, Troy (1990) includes all employment in education, health, and welfare ser-
vices as being in the public sector in Canada. Because many employees in health and welfare
services-and to a lesser extent in education-work for private employers, these adjustments
probably overstate the size ofCanada's public sector. Meltz (1989) also includes all education and
health in Canada in the public sector.
24. The tabulations in tables 4.8 and 4.9 are based on the full samples (after exclusions),
whereas the tabulations and parameter estimates in table 4.6 are based on random subsamples.
Thus small differences in the reported statistics may exist.135 Unionization in Canada and the United States
Table 4.8 Percentage ofEmployed Paid Workers in the Public Sector, Canada
and the United States, December 1984
Canada U.S.











Processing, machining, laborers 9 5
Transportation, moving 23 6
Materials handling 11 10
Industry
Agriculture 0 3
Forestry, fishing 14 54
Mining 5 0
Construction 0 9
Durable manufacturing 0 1
Nondurable manu~acturing 1 0
Transportation 40 24
Communication, utilities 59 15
Wholesale trade 1 0
Retail trade 2 1
Finance, insurance, real estate 8 I
Education, related services 75 80
Health, welfare services 25 20
Other services 1 3
Public administration 100 100
Sources: Tabulated from Statistics Canada, Survey of Union Membership, supplement to the
Labour Force Survey, December 1984; and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPS earnings file,
supplement to the Current Population Survey, December 1984. Excluded from the sample are
nonpaid workers (self-employed, unpaid family workers), armed forces, those not employed in
the reference period, and observations with missing values for the relevant variables.
Table 4.9 shows the extent ofunion organization among public and private
sector employees by gender, full-time and part-time employment, occupation,
and industry. In both countries there are very substantial differences in union
density between the public and private sectors. Using the preferred measure
of union status (collective agreement coverage), 81 percent ofCanadian pub-
lic sector paid workers are unionized versus 34 percent in the private sector.
For the United States the comparable union densities are 41 percent in the
public sector and 16 percent in the private sector. Thus in both countries pub-136 W. Craig Riddell
Table 4.9 Extent ofUnion Organization ofGovernment and Private Employed Paid
Workers in Canada and the United States, December 1984
Percentage ofPaid Workers
Percentage ofPaid Workers Covered by a Collective
Who Are Union Members Agreement
Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector
Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S. Canada U.S.
All workers 74 34 29 15 81 41 34 16
Males 75 40 35 20 81 45 39 21
Females 72 29 23 9 80 37 27 10
Full-time 77 39 32 17 84 46 37 19
Part-time 49 11 15 6 60 16 19 6
Occupation
Managerial, professional,
technical 73 36 24 6 80 42 30 8
Clerical 74 30 19 9 83 37 23 11
Sales 66 11 8 5 72 19 11 6
Service 67 37 21 7 74 42 23 8
Primary 70 21 25 4 73 26 27 4
Processing, machining, laborers 86 39 52 31 89 47 56 33
Transportation, moving 89 42 36 29 92 42 41 30
Materials handling 80 40 50 30 83 41 55 32
Industry
Agriculture n.a. 0 2 1 n.a. 0 3 2
Forestry, fishing 63 8 37 0 67 8 40 0
Mining 42 n.a. 34 21 50 n.a. 38 21
Construction n.a. 39 41 22 n.a. 40 45 23
Durable manufacturing 100 51 50 29 100 56 55 32
Nondurable manufacturing 71 75 47 22 77 86 51 24
Transportation 84 69 39 33 86 73 44 35
Communication, utilities 74 36 59 42 80 51 63 47
Wholesale trade 9 0 14 6 9 0 18 6
Retail trade 60 19 13 6 80 27 16 7
Finance, insurance, real estate 55 14 6 4 63 14 9 5
Education, related services 81 38 44 10 89 46 56 13
Health, welfare services 72 24 53 6 78 28 60 8
Other services 44 13 9 6 45 18 12 7
Public administration 69 29 n.a. n.a. 78 35 n.a. n.a.
Sources: See table 4.8.
Note: N.a. means that there were no paid workers (covered or not covered) in the category.
lic sector employees are more than twice as likely as their private sector coun-
terparts to be represented by a union. Even within the same industry or occu-
pation, workers in publicly owned enterprises in both countries are much
more likely to be organized than their counterparts in privately owned en-
terprises. These differences explain the large and highly significant coeffi-137 Unionization in Canada and the United States
cient on public sector status in the unionization equation estimates reported in
table 4.6.
Also noteworthy is the finding that the rule ofthumb discussed in the con-
text oftable 4.2-that a randomly selected Canadian worker is about twice as
likely to be unionized as his or her U.S. counterpart-continues to hold when
the data are broken down into the public and private sectors. For the public
sector as a whole, union density is 81 percent in Canada versus 41 percent in
the United States. The comparable statistics for the private sector are 34 per-
cent for Canada and 16 percent for the United States. Thus, although the ex-
tent of union organization is higher in each country's public sector, the
Canada-U.S. relative unionization differential is the same (i.e., a ratio of ap-
proximately two to one) in both the public and private sectors.
Because the determinants ofunion coverage may differ between the private
and public sectors in each country, separate probit models were estimated for
the two sectors. The parameter estimates were then used to decompose the
intercountry unionization differential by sector into a component associated
with differences in the characteristics ofthe respective labor forces and a com-
ponent associated with the impacts of those characteristics on the probability
of union coverage. These decompositions are shown in part A of table 4.7.25
In the private sector, all of the intercountry gap in unionization is due to dif-
ferences in the impacts and none to differences in the characteristics of the
respective labor forces. In the public sector, 95 percent ofthe gap is associated
with differences in the estimated probit parameters, and only 5 percent with
intercountry differences in characteristics. Thus these results further
strengthen the conclusion reached in the previous section that-apart from
the greater extent ofpublic sector employment in Canada-differences in the
structures of the respective labor forces account for very little of the large
intercountry differential in union coverage.
The decompositions for each sector reported in column 3 ofpart A oftable
4.7 were also broken down to show the contribution ofeach variable, as done
for the full sample in part B of table 4.7. In the private sector approximately
half of the total gap is attributed to the larger Canadian constant term; about
30 percent is attributed to larger Canadian coefficients associated with partic-
ular industries (especially education, health, and welfare) and about 8 percent
to larger Canadian coefficients associated with particular occupations (espe-
cially primary occupations). In the public sector more than two-thirds of the
gap is attributed to the higher constant term in the Canadian probit equation
and about one-third to the occupational coefficients, especially clerical, pro-
cessing, transportation and moving, and materials handling occupations.
In summary, analysis of the public and private sectors separately does not
alter the conclusions reached from the analysis of the full samples. Within
25. Estimated parameters for the public and private sectors separately are available on request
from me, as are the breakdowns showing the contributions ofeach variable.138 W. Craig Riddell
each sector differences in the structural characteristics of the Canadian and
U.S. labor forces account for very little ofthe intercountry unionization gap.
Almost all ofthe differential is due to the greater likelihood ofunion coverage
of a Canadian worker with a given set ofcharacteristics. In each sector, most
of the gap can be accounted for by the fact that an employee with the same
set ofcharacteristics is much more likely to be covered by a collective agree-
ment in Canada. The remainder of the differential in each sector can largely
be attributed to the fact that Canadian workers employed in particular indus-
tries and occupations are more likely to be unionized than are U.S. workers
with the same personal characteristics employed in the same industries and
occupations.
4.6 Social Attitudes toward Unionization
Explanations ofthe substantial Canada-U.S. gap in unionization must con-
front the difficult task of distinguishing between endogenous and exogenous
forces. For example, beginning with Weiler (1983, 1984), several scholars
have identified intercountry differences in the legal framework governing
union formation and the practice of collective bargaining as being important
contributors to the unionization differential. However, do the laws in each
country not simply reflect the underlying values held by the citizens of the
respective societies? Canada-U.S. differences in the legal framework govern-
ing collective bargaining and in the extent ofunion organization may thus be
jointly endogenous outcomes of fundamental value differences between the
two societies.
The thesis that the gap in unionization is due to differences between Canada
and the United States in underlying social values has been stated most force-
fully by Lipset (1986). It is certainly possible to make a persuasive case that
the values and institutions ofCanada and the United States differ in important
and apparently enduring ways (Lipset 1990). Canadians are more inclined to
favor collective forms of organization and state intervention in the economy
than are Americans, who place more importance on individual rights and free-
doms and free enterprise. On the surface, these apparent differences in social
values are consistent with the differences between Canada and the United
States in the role played by unions. If underlying social attitudes are an im-
portant source, however, why did the Canada-U.S. unionization differential
emerge only in the past three decades? Why did the two countries display very
similar trends in union density until the 1950s? Clearly Lipset's hypothesis
requires a more careful examination.
Comparative evidence on social attitudes toward unions is available from
similar public opinion polls in both the United States and Canada. The U.S.
data have been used by Lipset (1986) to support the view that postwar changes
in American attitudes toward unions are responsible for the decline in union
density in that country. In particular, there is a strong correlation between139 Unionization in Canada and the United States
American attitudes toward unions (as measured by the responses to the ques-
tion, "In general, do you approve or disapprove oflabor unions?") and union
density. As can be seen from table 4.10 and figure 4.2, since the early 1950s
there has been a steady decline in the percentage ofAmericans with favorable
attitudes toward unions and a steady increase in the percentage who disap-
prove ofunions.
However, inspection of table 4.10 and figure 4.3 reveals that these same
trends have occurred in Canada. Indeed, both the percentage who approve or
disapprove ofunions at each point in time and the changes in these levels over
time are remarkably similar in the two countries. A more formal test of this
Table 4.10 Attitudes toward Unions in Canada and the United States,
Percentage ofRespondents
Canada U.S.


















1978 46 41 59 31






Sources: Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Report (Toronto: various years);
Gallup Poll, The Gallup Report (Princeton, N.J.: various years).
Notes: For Canada the question posed was, "Generally speaking, do you think that labour unions
have been a good thing or a bad thing for Canada" (1950 to 1958 and 1976 to 1985). During the
period 1961 to 1975 the question posed was, "In general do you approve or disapprove oflabour
unions?" For the United States the question posed was, "In general, do you approve ordisapprove
of labor unions?"
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Fig. 4.2 Attitudes toward unions, United States, 1949-85
Sources: See table 4.10.
Note: USFAV = percent in favor, United States; USUNF = percent not in favor, United States.
similarity was carried out by regressing the percentage in favor of unions in
each country on a constant term and a time trend. The hypothesis that the
responses were drawn from a population with the same attitudes toward
unions cannot be rejected. 26 A similar result obtains when the percentage who
disapprove ofunions is used as the dependent variable.
In summary, although the two societies differ in many ways, Canadians and
Americans evidently have very similar attitudes toward unions. Changes in
these attitudes during the past four decades have also been remarkably similar
in the two countries. Thus there is no empirical support for the view that the
26. The downward trend in favorable attitudes toward unions is actually steeper in Canada than
in the United States, although the differences are not statistically significant. The estimated equa-
tions are
USFAV = 92.6 - 0.43 TIME
(13.3) (- 4.2)
and
CANFAV = 92.0 - 0.53 TIME,
(10.8) (- 4.3)
where USFAV and CANFAV are the percentage who approve ofunions in the United States and
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Fig. 4.3 Attitudes toward unions, Canada, 1950-84
Sources: See table 4.10.
Note: CANFAV = percent in favor, Canada; CANUNF = percent not in favor, Canada.
Canada-U.S. unionization differential can be attributed to fundamental differ-
ences in social attitudes toward unions and collective bargaining.
4.7 Costs ofUnionization to Employers
Several studies have noted that Canada appears to have significantly less
overt management opposition to unions in the form of unfair labor practices
and significantly more union organizing activity (Freeman 1986; Kumar
1991). The reasons for lower levels of management opposition to unions are
not clear, however, especially given the close corporate linkages between the
two countries. One view is that the Canadian legal framework and the asso-
ciated administration and enforcement mechanisms reduce the incentives to
oppose unions relative to the United States (Flanagan 1987; Kumar 1991).
However, another possible explanation is that unionization is less costly to
Canadian employers than to their U.S. counterparts.
Evidence relating to possible intercountry differences in the costs asso-
ciated with unionization is presented in table 4.11. The union-nonunion wage142 W. Craig Riddell















Sources: See table 4.8.
Notes: Based on log earnings equations estimated by OLS separately on the covered and uncov-
ered sectors. Differentials are evaluated at the mean ofthe data in the sector and country. Controls
included gender, part-time, age, education, public sector (total economy estimates), industry, and
occupation.
differentials are estimated using the 1984 SUM and CPS earnings file; both
data sets contain comparable information on hourly earnings.
These estimated union wage impacts indicate that the costs ofunionization
are very similar in the two countries, particularly in the private sector, where
possible management opposition to unions is most relevant. Thus this evi-
dence does not support the position that lower levels of overt management
opposition to unions in Canada are due to Canadian unions having less impact
on wages than their U.S. counterparts do.
4.8 Conclusions
Canada and the United States displayed similar patterns of union growth
from the early 1900s until the mid-1950s. Since that time, trends in unioniza-
tion have diverged sharply, with union density declining steadily in the United
States but growing in Canada until the mid-1980s and subsequently declining
modestly. As a consequence, a huge Canada-U.S. gap has emerged in the
extent of union organization-so that in recent years the fraction of the Ca-
nadian labor force represented by unions has been approximately double that
of the United States. The dramatic decline in union strength in the United
States and the emergence ofa substantial Canada-U.S. unionization differen-
tial are important developments affecting these two societies. This paper has
been concerned with contributing to our understanding of the causes ofthese
dramatic developments, taking advantage ofthe "natural experiment" yielded
by two countries with not only similar economies but also similar histories of
union development and industrial relations systems. To as great an extent as
possible I have used data sets that are comparable between the two countries,
so that differences in observed outcomes are due mainly to differences in
underlying behavior rather than to differences in surveyor questionnaire de-
sign.143 Unionization in Canada and the United States
The main findings ofthis comparative analysis are the following:
1. The intercountry differences in union coverage are pervasive rather than
being concentrated in specific sectors ofthe economy or segments ofthe labor
force. Whether individuals are classified by gender, age, industry, occupation,
public or private sector employment, or education, a Canadian worker is ap-
proximately twice as likely to be represented by a union as his or her Ameri-
can counterpart.
2. A comparative demand-supply analysis indicates that the gap in union-
ization can be attributed to the greater likelihood that a Canadian worker who
wishes to be represented by a union will in fact be unionized (supply condi-
tional on demand) and to the greater desire for union representation by Cana-
dians. This finding is consistent with the view that differences between Can-
ada and the United States in overt management opposition to unions and the
legal framework governing union formation and the practice ofcollective bar-
gaining contribute to the unionization differential.
3. A comparative microanalysis of union incidence concludes that struc-
tural differences in the respective economies and labor forces account for
about 15 percent of the intercountry differential in unionization. Eighty-five
percent ofthe differential is attributed to the fact that a Canadian worker with
given characteristics is much more likely to be covered by a collective agree-
ment than aU.S. worker with the same characteristics.
4. The only quantitatively important structural difference arises from the
fact that the fraction of paid workers employed in government-owned enter-
prises is about 30 percent higher in Canada than in the United States. In both
countries, public sector employees are substantially more likely to be union-
ized than their private sector counterparts in the same industry or occupation.
The greater involvement ofpublicly owned enterprises in the Canadian econ-
omy accounts for about 7 percent ofthe intercountry differential in union den-
sity.
5. There is no empirical support for the hypothesis that the Canada-U.s.
gap in union coverage is due to differences between the two countries in the
underlying social attitudes toward unions.
6. The impact ofunions on wages in the private sector is very similar. Thus
intercountry differences in the costs to employers associated with unionization
cannot account for differences in the amount ofovert management opposition
to unions.
On the whole these findings support the hypothesis that much of the
Canada-U.S. unionization gap can be attributed to intercountry differences in
the legal regime pertaining to unions and collective bargaining and to differ-
ences in overt management opposition to unions (itself possibly a conse-
quence of differences in collective bargaining laws and their administration).
Only a modest portion ofthe differential in union coverage is associated with
the greater extent ofpublic sector employment in Canada. Other explanations
ofthe differential that have been advanced receive little, ifany, support.144 W. Craig Riddell
Appendix
Table 4A.l Demand for Unionization in the Public and Private Sectors
AFL Survey CFL Survey Pooled Sample
Variable Public Private Public Private Public Private
Constant 0.18 -0.48 -1.28 0.31 -0.68 -0.29
(0.3) (- 1.5) (- 1.6) (0.6) (- 1.6) (- 1.1)
Male 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.37 0.08 0.17
(0.6) (0.8) (0.3) (2.6) (0.6) (2.1)
Age 25-34 0.19 0.05 0.20 -0.25 0.15 -0.03
(0.7) (0.4) (0.4) (-1.1) (0.6) (-0.2)
Age 35-44 0.08 0.14 0.56 0.11 0.22 0.16
(0.3) (0.9) (1.1) (0.5) (0.9) (1.2)
Age 45-54 0.46 0.03 1.01 -0.08 0.62 0.02
(1.3) (0.2) (1.7) (-0.3) (2.1) (0.2)
Age 55-64 -0.14 0.24 1.37 -0.11 0.30 0.10
(-0.4) (1.2) (1.8) (-0.3) (0.9) (0.6)
Age 65+ -0.01 -0.18 -0.61 -0.05 -0.34
(-0.0) (-0.4) (- 1.0) (-0.0) (-0.9)
Some high school 0.30 0.71 1.34 -0.43 0.82 0.24
(0.5) (2.2) (2.0) (-0.9) (2.0) (0.9)
High school graduate 0.08 0.48 1.86 -0.33 0.83 0.22
(0.2) (1.6) (2.9) (-0.7) (2.3) (0.9)
Some college -0.10 0.07 2.02 -0.32 0.87 -0.05
(-0.2) (0.2) (3.0) (-0.7) (2.2) (-0.2)
Some university -0.42 -0.04 2.12 -0.58 0.61 -0.22
(-0.7) (-0.1) (2.7) (-1.1) (1.4) (-0.7)
University graduate -0.15 -0.34 1.76 -0.29 0.66 -0.34
(-0.3) (-1.1) (2.8) (-0.6) (1.8) (- 1.3)
Canada 0.65 0.19
(4.4) (2.2)
N 216 674 179 338 395 1,012
Currently predicted (%) 62 62 85 58 72 58145 Unionization in Canada and the United States
Table 4A.2 Supply ofUnionization in the Public and Private Sectors
AFL Survey CFL Survey Pooled Sample
Variable Public Private Public Private Public Private
Constant -2.12 -1.61 6.24 -0.53 -1.23 -1.22
(-2.6) (-2.9) (0.0) (-0.7) (-2.0) (-2.9)
Male 0.18 0.93 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.63
(0.7) (5.8) (0.9) (0.9) (1.2) (5.0)
Age 25-34 1.41 0.47 -0.12 0.62 0.85 0.47
(2.5) (2.0) (-0.2) (2.0) (2.4) (2.6)
Age 35-44 1.85 0.67 -0.24 0.67 1.05 0.56
(3.2) (2.6) (-0.4) (2.1) (2.9) (2.9)
Age 45-54 1.50 0.62 -0.03 1.41 0.99 0.79
(2.5) (2.3) (- 0.1) (3.3) (2.6) (3.6)
Age 55-64 1.97 1.39 -0.23 6.19 1.16 1.51
(2.9) (4.1) (-0.3) (0.0) (2.7) (5.2)
Age 65+ -3.99 -5.4 -6.01 -4.89 0.13
(-0.0) (-0.0) (0.0) (-0.0) (0.2)
Some high school 0.26 0.62 -5.6 -0.15 -0.24 0.09
(0.4) (1.1) (-0.0) (-0.2) (-0.4) (0.2)
High school graduate 0.30 0.35 -5.5 0.47 -0.05 0.20
(0.5) (0.7) (-0.0) (0.7) (-0.1) (0.5)
Some college 0.32 0.39 -4.2 0.33 0.46 0.17
(0.4) (0.7) (-0.0) (0.5) (0.8) (0.4)
Some university 0.18 -0.06 -5.5 0.07 -0.11 -0.04
(0.2) (-0.1) (-0.0) (0.1) (-0.2) (-0.1)
University graduate 0.86 0.41 -5.1 -0.09 0.48 -0.01
(1.4) (0.7) (-0.0) (-0.1) (0.9) (-0.0)
Canada 1.02 0.67
(5.8) (5.1)
N 133 302 150 181 283 483
Currently predicted (%) 64 69 83 70 73 69146 W. Craig Riddell
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